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Rothschild (2001) argues that the invisible hand refers to blind individuals and presume
privileged knowledge on the part of the social scientist. For this reason, she takes it that the
invisible hand is, in fact, an un￿Smithian concept and that Smith was making an ironical
joke. In this brief comment, I argue that the invisible hand does not imply blind and futile
individuals or privileged knowledge and it cannot be argued that it is an un￿Smithian concept
on these grounds. Briefly, it is argued here that although it may be true that Smith used the
invisible hand somewhat ironically, this does not imply that it is un￿Smithian.
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1.  Introduction 
The  invisible  hand  is  probably  the  most  popular  concept  in  economics.  Yet,  despite  its 
popularity its implied meaning is not generally very clear. Moreover, there is no consensus 
even on what Adam Smith meant by the invisible hand (Brown 1997, Gramph 2000). A 
recent interpretation of the concept takes it that it is un-Smithian. Rothschild (2001) argues 
that invisible-hand arguments refer to blind individuals and presume privileged knowledge on 
the part of the social scientist. Yet, Adam Smith’s general views about human nature suggest 
that Smith would not accept that individuals are blind and futile, and that he, as a philosopher, 
has privileged knowledge. This apparent conflict leads Rothschild to argue that the invisible 
hand is, in fact, an un-Smithian concept and that Smith was making an ironical joke. She 
argues  that  this  is  the  most  plausible  interpretation  of  Smith’s  ‘invisible  hand’  given  the 
tension between the connotations of the invisible hand and Smith’s overall conception of 
human nature. 
In this note I argue that the invisible hand does not imply blind and futile individuals or 
privileged knowledge and it cannot be argued that it is an un-Smithian concept on these 
grounds.
1 Briefly, it is argued here that although it may be true that Smith used the invisible 
hand somewhat ironically, this does not imply that it is un-Smithian. The plan of the paper is 
as follows: The second section outlines Rothschild’s argument. The third section portrays the 
invisible hand as placeholder for connecting principles of nature. The fourth section presents a 
definition of invisible-hand consequences. The fifth section discusses whether invisible hand 
implies blind and futile individuals. The sixth section clarifies a misunderstanding concerning 
the relation between invisible hand and self-interest. The seventh section questions whether 
the invisible hand implies privileged knowledge. The eighth and ninth sections discuss the 
religious connotations of the invisible hand. The tenth section concludes the note. 
2.  The Invisible Hand as an un-Smithian Concept 
Smith uses the phrase ‘invisible hand’ only three times and in different contexts. In his essay 
on  History  of  Astronomy  (henceforth  HA)  he  refers  to  those  individuals  who  ascribe  the 
‘irregular events of nature to the agency and power of their gods’ (Smith 1795: 49). In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (henceforth TMS) he invokes the ‘invisible hand’ when he tries to 
show how the selfish behaviour of the rich (in combination with natural forces) ‘advance the 
interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species’ (Smith 1790: 
IV.I.10). In the Wealth of Nations (henceforth WN) he uses it when he tries to show how 
merchants  support  the  public  interest  when  they  intend  to  increase  their  security  ‘by 
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry’ (Smith 1789: IV.2.9). Based on 
an investigation of the contexts in which the ‘invisible hand’ appear in comparison to Smith’s 
general views, Rotschild (1994, 2001) argues that Smith was making an ironical joke and that 
Smith  was  sardonic  in  his  use  of  ‘invisible  hand’.  More  importantly  she  argues  that  the 
invisible hand is un-Smithian. Rothschild suggests that the idea of ‘invisible hand’ does not fit 
Smith’s  general  framework  and  that  Smith  would  not  have  favoured  such  an  idea.  This 
suggestion  is  based  on  the  following  statements  concerning  the  invisible  hand:  (i)  The 
invisible hand connects the parts of socio-economic world in an orderly way without the need 
of invoking a designer who is responsible for this order (Rothschild 2001: 122). (ii) The idea 
of individuals who are not able to see the overall picture and who are acting blindly conflicts 
with Smith’s overall thought; ‘to be contemptuous of individual intentions, to see them as 
futile and blind, is to take a distinctively un-Smithian view of human life’ (Rothschild 2001: 
124). (iii) Smith’s proposal in WN that merchants should not seek their individual interests by 
                                                       
1   Also see Bridel and Salvat (2004) and Eltis (2004) who think that Rothschild’s argument is not convincing.  
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political means (particularly by supporting restrictions on imports) is conflicting with the idea 
that they would promote the public good by pursuing their self-interests (Rothschild 2001: 
126-28).  (iv)  Because  the  invisible  hand  ‘is  founded  on  a  notion  of  privileged  universal 
knowledge’ and  ‘it presupposes the existence of a theorist […] who sees more that any 
ordinary  individual  can,’  it  is  un-Smithian  (Rothschild  2001:  124).  (v)  The  religious 
connotations of the invisible hand conflict with Smith’s irreligious views (Rothschild 2001: 
129-30). (vi) The Stoic idea of a providential order, which is implied by the invisible hand, 
conflicts with Smith’s general views (Rothschild 2001: 131-32). 
Rothschild argues that despite the fact that the first statement would have been favoured by 
Smith, other connotations of the invisible hand (ii - vi) make it un-Smithian. However, not all 
her arguments are defensible: (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi) do not take into account the type of 
unintended  consequences  implied  by  the  invisible  hand.  Moreover,  in  (iv)  Rothschild 
overlooks Smith’s thoughts concerning philosophy, and in (v) she fails to notice that that the 
invisible hand in TMS and WN does not necessarily have religious connotations. Last but not 
least, throughout her argument Rothschild implicitly presumes that unintended consequences 
are equivalent to unanticipated consequences. Yet this is not true. 
3.  The Invisible Hand and the Connecting Principles 
Rothschild’s first statement is that the invisible hand connects the parts of socio-economic 
world in an orderly way without the need of invoking a designer who is responsible for this 
order. She argues that this conception of the invisible hand would be supported by Smith. I 
agree. Yet Rothschild does not explain what exactly the invisible hand refers to under this 
interpretation. To show that invisible hand is a truly Smithian idea we need to examine further 
how the invisible hand is supposed to connect the parts of the socio-economic world: 
“Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descent, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the 
necessity  of  their  own  nature;  nor  was  the  invisible  hand  of  Jupiter  ever  apprehended  to  be 
employed  in  those  matters.  But  the  thunder  and  lightening,  storms  and  sunshine,  those  more 
irregular events, were ascribed to his favour, or his anger.” (Smith 1795: 49, emphasis added) 
In HA Smith uses the phrase ‘invisible hand of Jupiter’ to argue that in the very early stages of 
the society people used to explain irregular events as the acts of invisible beings such as gods. 
He states that in those days people had ‘little curiosity to find out the hidden chains of events 
which bind together the seemingly disjoined appearances of nature’ (Smith 1795: 48 emphasis 
added). He argues that in the first ages of society individuals would consider the regular and 
usual  acts  of  nature  as  given  and  in  need  of  no  explanation,  but  they  would  explain  the 
irregular events with reference to the acts of gods. 
“With  him,  therefore,  every  object  of  nature,  which  by  its  beauty  or  greatness,  its  utility  or 
hurtfulness, is considerable enough to attract his attention, and whose operations are not perfectly 
regular, is supposed to act by the direction of some invisible and designing power.” Smith (1795: 
48 emphasis added) 
Smith thinks that this behaviour is ‘the origin of Polytheism and vulgar superstition which 
ascribes all the irregular events of nature to the favour and displeasure of intelligent, though 
invisible  beings,  to  gods,  daemons,  witches,  genii,  fairies’  (Smith  1795:  48).  It  is  in  this 
context that Smith uses the phrase ‘invisible hand of Jupiter’ (also see Davis 1990 and Ingrao 
1998). So, he argues, savage man would not think about the acts of Jupiter when he observes 
the regular events of nature, rather he would explain the apparently irregular events with the 
invisible  hand  of  Jupiter.  Smith  is  critical  about  these  individuals  who  failed  to  see  the 
connecting chains of nature and who explained some natural phenomena as the consequences 
of the actions of invisible and powerful beings. He suggests that in order to understand nature   3 
one has to search these apparently invisible chains of connecting events. He argues that it is 
the task of philosophy to do this. With the development of society and specialisation some of 
the individuals in the society had the security and time to investigate these causes. These 
individuals became ‘less disposed to employ, for this connecting chain, those invisible beings 
whom the fear and ignorance of their rude forefathers had engendered’ (Smith 1795: 50). 
Strikingly, a similar argument appears in WN: 
“The great phenomena of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, comets; thunder, 
lightning,  and  other  extraordinary  meteors;  the  generation,  the  life,  growth,  and  dissolution  of 
plants and animals; are objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call 
forth the curiosity, of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy 
this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. 
Philosophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such 
as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods.” (Smith 1789: V.1.152, 
emphasis added) 
Philosophy, according to Smith, ‘is the science of the connecting principles of nature’ (Smith 
1795: 45): “Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains which bind together all these 
disjoined  objects,  endeavours  to  introduce  order  into  this  chaos  of  jarring  and  discordant 
appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it” (Smith 1795: 45 – 46). 
Smith approaches the questions about understanding nature from a cognitive perspective. He 
argues  that  when  we  see  two  distant  phenomena  that  seem  to  be  somehow  related,  our 
imagination feels uncomfortable and tries to fill in the gap between these phenomena. As the 
savage man used to fill in the gap by imagining the acts of invisible beings, philosophers fill 
in the gap by explaining them with more familiar causes, and by trying to find out the chain of 
events that connects these phenomena, which were invisible to us at first sight (Smith 1795: 
41-42). 
Smith  discusses  the  history  of  astronomy  to  demonstrate  the  several  ways  in  which 
philosophers tried to discover the connecting principles of celestial appearances. HA is an 
essay where Smith tries to demonstrate the validity of his arguments about imagination and of 
his  basic  argument  that  wonder,  surprise  and  admiration  are  the  main  sentiments  behind 
scientific discovery. In the essay, he tries to abstract from the relation between the several 
models—which he calls systems—of astronomy and reality. He merely wants to show how 
these models were created to ‘sooth the imagination’ (Smith 1795: 46). 
It is possible to interpret Smith’s “philosophy of science” in two ways (cf. Lindgren 1969). 
The first possibility is that Smith may have an account of scientific theories that considers 
them as ‘mere inventions of imagination,’ or as systems that helps us to “save the observed 
phenomena”, which do not have to be true or false (cf. van Fraassen 1980). Thus, they are 
simply conjectures that help us ease our minds. The second possibility is that Smith may have 
thought that scientific systems (models, theories) are quests for understanding real relations in 
nature, but also that we can never be sure about the truth of our theories (see Thomson 1965). 
Thus, since there is no guarantee of truth, they are conjectures about what may be real. In fact, 
Smith’s comments about Newton’s theory suggest the second minimal realist reading (Smith 
1795: 104 - 105). Nonetheless, he is not conclusive about whether Newton’s theory may be 
considered true about the real world (Smith 1795: 105).
 Of course, he may have entertained 
both of these views, in the sense that the former applies to natural and the latter to moral 
philosophy:  
Whatever the type of realism he may have entertained, Smith is a philosopher (and considers 
himself as a philosopher) whose task is to conjecture about the connecting principles of nature 
and  society,  to  create  a  coherent  body  of  thought  that  would  render  it  more  easy  to  our  
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imagination how the nature and causes of the wealth of nations as well as the basic sentiments 
and dispositions of man are related to each other. Smith, both in TMS and in WN, is at pains to 
show  how  things  are  connected  to  each  other.  In  TMS  he  tries  to  explain  how  the  self-
regarding actions of the rich may work for the society as a whole, despite the fact that the land 
is unevenly distributed. In WN he tries to show why and how without import restrictions 
society may be better off by virtue of the interaction between the self-regarding actions of 
individuals. In these texts he indeed tries to show how the actions of the individuals (and 
additionally in TMS that of nature) work for the good of society, although they are acting self-
regardingly. He tries to show how two apparently distinct things, self-interested action and 
beneficial  social  consequences  are  connected  to  each  other.  He  tries  to  provide  those 
connecting principles of the society that at first glance were invisible. Thus, the ‘invisible 
hand’ should be read as a metaphorical statement that implies the explication of some of the 
connecting principles of society. In HA the invisible hand is the invisible hand of Jupiter, 
which  is  called  upon  by  the  superstitious  savage  man.  In  TMS  and  WN  it  indicates  the 
explication of some of the apparently invisible forces in society by a philosopher: Adam 
Smith. Briefly, from the point of view of Smith’s ideas about philosophy there seems to be 
nothing  about  the  invisible  hand  that  is  un-Smithian.  But  this  does  not  yet  answer 
Rothschild’s other concerns. We should now inquire into the relation between the invisible 
hand and unintended consequences. 
4.  Unintended Social Consequences 
The  type  of  unintended  social  consequences  that  is  implied  by  the  invisible  hand  and 
invisible-hand  explanations  (Ullmann-Margalit  1978)  has  the  following  important 
characteristics: (i) The consequence is located at the social level; (ii) it was not intended by 
any  individual;  (iii)  it  is  mediated  through  a  multiplicity  of  individuals;  (iv)  individual 
intentions are directed to the individual level; i.e., individuals do not intent to bring about 
social consequences; (v) individuals do not pursue the same end collectively; i.e., collective 
intentionality is excluded
2 (for the details of this characterization see Aydinonat 2004 and 
Mäki 1990). 
Given  this  definition,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  ‘unintended’  and  ‘unanticipated’ 
consequences. It seems reasonable to think that if a consequence is unanticipated it should be 
unintended and vice versa. But this is not the case. First of all, an unanticipated consequence 
might be intended. For example, when I buy a lottery ticket I intend to win (or intend to 
increase my chances of winning) the lottery. However, I do not anticipate that I will win. If I 
win,  this  would  be  an  unanticipated  intended  consequence.  Second,  an  anticipated 
consequence may be unintended. For example, when I take a shortcut through a public green 
field, I may anticipate that if others do the same, the plants may be irrecoverably damaged. 
Yet I do not intend to bring about this consequence when I take the short cut—I may be 
ignorant about other people’s behaviour and about the final consequence. Or, when someone 
drives home, despite the fact that he has consumed three glasses of whisky, he may anticipate 
that if things go wrong he may end up at the police station. However, it is not his intention to 
do so: He simply intends to go home. Thus, in some cases we may have unintended but 
anticipated  consequences:  Invisible-hand  consequences  may  be  either  anticipated  or 
unanticipated. 
Having defined the set of unintended consequences that is relevant for the notion of invisible 
hand, we may proceed to discuss Rothschild’s other statements concerning the invisible hand. 
                                                       
2   Note that this does not out rule cases where individuals pursue the same end independently—that is, without a collective 
decision to do so.   5 
5.  Blindness and the Invisible Hand 
Does the fact that Smith refers to individuals who are not aware of the future consequences of 
their action, and who fail to see the invisible hand make the ‘invisible hand’ an un-Smithian 
idea? Rothschild thinks so. She argues that the word “invisible” implies blindness and points 
out that Smith ‘sees the people as the best judges of their interest […]. But the subjects of 
invisible-hand explanation are blind, in that they cannot see the hand by which they are led’ 
(Rothschild 2001: 123) Thus, she concludes: the ‘invisible hand’ cannot be a truly Smithian 
idea. 
A certain type of “blindness” may be identified in the argument against import regulations in 
WN
3 in two different forms. Firstly, it is argued that those who try to implement the import 
regulations cannot judge the interests of the individuals. They cannot observe their interests 
and the peculiarities of their individual situation. These are invisible to the regulators (see 
Smith 1789: IV.2.10). In TMS, Smith talks about a legislator who wishes to rule a society and 
argues that no individual can know what is good for all the others, and since one is “blind” to 
the principles of the motion of other individuals, it is better to let individuals judge for their 
own what is good for them (Smith 1790: VI.II.42). We may add to this that since the exact 
response of the individuals to a regulation cannot be known in advance, the legislator would 
also be “blind” to the future consequences of his regulation. The second form of “blindness” 
is the “blindness” of the individuals who do not intend to bring about social consequences. As 
the legislator, any individual is “blind” to the decisions taken by the rest of the individuals 
that may influence the consequences of his action. They may also be “blind” to other factors 
that  may  influence  the  consequence  of  their  action.  These  two  forms  of  “blindness”  are 
essentially similar.
4 “Blindness” is attributed to all individuals in the society, to merchants as 
well as to legislators, tailors, shoemakers, etc. The legislator cannot judge for the individuals, 
and any individual judges better for himself as long as he is not intending to bring about 
social consequences. Individuals are “blind” to the social consequences of their action, but 
concerning their own interests and their local environment
5 they know better than others.
6 
Smith argues that it is good for the society when each and every individual intends to bring 
about consequences at the individual level—at least for the cases in which he employs the 
‘invisible hand’. He assumes that when every individual acts in this way, beneficial social 
consequences may be brought about. 
Rothschild thinks that the “blindness” implied by the invisible hand is un-Smithian in that it 
conflicts with the view that individuals are the best judges of their interest. She argues that 
this ‘independence and idiosyncrasy of individuals is what Smith seems to be denying in his 
account of the invisible hand; it is in this sense a thoroughly un-Smithian idea’ (Rothschild 
1994: 320). Yet when we distinguish between interests directed to the individual level and to 
the social level we may see that Smith’s argument is the following: Individuals are the best 
judges of their interest, but they cannot judge the interests of the rest of the society (i.e., they 
are “blind” with respect to the interests of others); therefore they should not try to bring about 
social consequences. When seen like this, the “invisible hand” seems to be a truly Smithian 
                                                       
3   A similar argument can be made for TMS as well. 
4   In fact, these two forms of blindness may be considered as resulting from “uncertainties” individuals may face: ‘On the 
one hand they may not know the exact mechanism by which an outcome (consequence) is brought about by a certain 
action. On the other hand, a specific outcome often depends not only on the action chosen by a particular agent, but also 
on the actions chosen by others.’ (Janssen 1993: 12) 
5   Note that ‘local environment’ represents actions of other individuals in that environment, and the consequences of these 
actions. 
6   One  may  argue  that  they  are  also  partially  blind  in  this  respect,  for  there  may  be  unintended  consequences  at  the 
individual level as well. Yet they relatively know better than others.  
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idea.
7 It represents the connecting principles of the society (real or imaginary), the network of 
interacting shoemakers, tailors, merchants, and all others who, by definition, are pursuing 
their self-interests, acting somewhat myopically, and who are nonetheless the best judges of 
their interests. There is nothing in Smith’s account of the invisible hand that would deny the 
“independence and idiosyncrasy of individuals.” 
6.  Pursuing self-interest at different levels 
Rothschild (2001: 126-28) also suggests that Smith’s proposal in WN that merchants should 
not seek their individual interests by political means (particularly by supporting restrictions on 
imports) conflicts with the idea that they would promote the public good by pursuing their 
self-interests.  Yet  from  the  above  argument  it  is  obvious  that  pursuing  self-interests  by 
political means (intentions about the social level) is an entirely different matter from pursuing 
self-interests at the individual level, and thus there is no such conflict.
8 
7.  Privileged Knowledge 
If no individual knows better than others what is good for the society, how can Smith know 
better?  How  can  he  be  against  import  regulations?  How  can  Smith  suggest  that  import 
regulations are either useless or hurtful (see Smith 1789: IV.2.11)? Rothschild (2001: 24) 
suggests  that  because  the  invisible  hand  ‘is  founded  on  a  notion  of  privileged  universal 
knowledge” and because “it presupposes the existence of a theorist […] who sees more than 
any ordinary individual can’ it is un-Smithian. 
Two important points should be noted. First of all, Smith sees philosophers as products of 
division of labour. They are not naturally better acquainted than others for inquiring into the 
connecting principles of nature and society, ‘by nature a philosopher is not in genius and 
disposition  half  so  different  from  a  street  porter’  (Smith  1789:  I.2.5).  But,  by  way  of 
specialization they can do better (Smith 1789: I.1.9). It is quite natural, then, that he thinks 
that he observes better than the porter, and that he is less “blind” to the connecting principles 
of nature and society than others who are specialized in other industries. Yet this does not 
necessarily imply privileged universal knowledge. He is speculating about those connecting 
principles.  It  is  also  true  that  Smith  thinks  that  the  shoemaker,  the  tailor,  as  well  as  the 
merchants are able to understand his argument that it is not to the advantage of a society to 
produce the goods that are produced less costly in other countries. But more importantly, 
Smith  does  not  presume  that  he  has  knowledge  of  the  local  situations  and  interests  of 
particular individuals. Rather, from the argument that this is not possible he suggests it is 
better to leave every individual to their own principles of motion. 
Moreover,  Rothschild  implicitly  assumes  that  ‘unintended’  means  ‘unanticipated’.  Yet  as 
argued  above  the  absence  of  foresight  and  awareness  of  the  social  consequence  is  not  a 
necessary condition for invisible-hand explanations. It is entirely possible that one or some of 
the individuals foresee the unintended consequence that lies ahead, but fail to act to change 
this consequence. There may be many reasons for this, but the most important seems to be 
that since there are many individuals who are involved in the process that brings about the 
                                                       
7   Rothschild argues that ‘Smith’s three uses of the phrase have in common that the individuals concerned—the people who 
fail  to  see  the  invisible  hand—are  quite  undignified;  they  are  silly  polytheists,  rapacious  proprietors,  disingenuous 
merchants.’ (Rothschild 2001: 124) Yet in HA Smith literally criticises those who invoke the invisible hand of Jupiter to 
explain natural phenomena. Although, it does not seem that the proprietors are rapacious (in TMS), and that merchants 
disingenuous (in WN) for Smith most probably considers the “blindness” of individuals as a fact of life, we may still 
grant that Rothschild may be right in that the use of invisible hand is somewhat ironic. 
8   It is of course true that in WN, Smith mostly talks about economic interests—which may be regarded as selfish—but we 
would  be doing injustice to Smith if we say that all his thought is based on selfish individuals (see Morrow 1923, Sugden 
2002, Werhane 1989, 1991).   7 
unintended consequence, it may be costly to deviate from the original intention/action unless 
others  do  the  same.  In  some  cases,  collective  action  may  be  costly  and/or  risky,  thus 
individuals may bring about an unintended but anticipated social consequence. Smith as well 
as any other individual may foresee or recognise unintended social consequences. For this 
reason Smith’s recognition of the beneficial unintended consequences does not imply that he 
has privileged universal knowledge. 
8.  Invisible Hand and Religion 
Rothschild (2001: 129-30) suggests that religious connotations of the invisible hand do not go 
well  with  Smith’s  somewhat  irreligious  views.  As  Rothschild  nicely  argues,  the  religious 
connotations come from its previous uses. Moreover, Smith uses it in a similar way in HA. He 
criticises those who associated the apparent irregularities of nature with the “invisible hand of 
Jupiter.”  This  supports  Rothschild’s  argument  that  Smith  used  the  phrase  somewhat 
ironically, in TMS and in WN. However, if Smith uses it ironically, this means that the latter 
uses do not necessarily have any religious connotation.
9 We may read the invisible hand as a 
metaphor  conveying  a  message  about  the  responses  of  our  imagination  to  the  surprising 
aspects of nature. In TMS and WN, it may be understood as saying that ‘what savage man may 
have associated with ‘the invisible hand of Jupiter’ is hereby explicated.’ Smith uses the 
phrase to indicate that behind the order of things (which we may associate with design) there 
is some “invisible” chain of events that brought them about. However, this does not mean that 
those events that were invisible to us at the first sight could not be explicated, or made visible. 
9.  Invisible Hand and Providential Order 
Rothschild (2001: 131-32) also argues that the Stoic idea of a providential order, which is 
ostensibly implied by the invisible hand, conflicts with Smith’s views. While it is true that 
Smith would not agree with the idea of an order that is not caused by the individuals who take 
part  in  it  (the  idea  of  providential  order),  Smith’s  use  of  the  invisible  hand  does  not 
necessarily imply such  an idea. On the contrary, individuals who are pursuing their self-
interests at the individual level bring about the consequences at the social level (also see 
Fleischacker 2004: 139). 
10.  Concluding Remarks 
The invisible hand is an important concept in economics and our understanding of it should 
rest on a good understanding of the subset of unintended consequences implied by it. As we 
have seen in this paper, the invisible hand is neither a mysterious concept, nor it implies 
complete blindness on the part of individuals or universal privileged knowledge on the part of 
scientists. In fact, on the contrary, the concept of invisible hand emphasises the will to remove 
mysteries  concerning  nature  and  society;  it  acknowledges  the  ability  of  men  to  act 
intentionally  and  calculate  the  consequences  of  their  action;  and  alerts  us  to  the 
incompleteness  of  our  knowledge  concerning  other  individuals  and  nature.  Unintended 
consequences are brought about by individuals who are pursuing their own ends and it is the 
task of the social scientist to explicate how different individuals are connected to each other in 
producing those consequences. The concept of invisible hand suggests that we should study 
how certain individual mechanisms (e.g., the principles of motion of different individuals) are 
connected to each other. Consequently, contrary to what Rothschild argues, the invisible hand 
seems to be a truly a Smithian concept. 
                                                       
9   If irony means ‘the use of words to express something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning’ (as 
defined in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary), it should be possible that Smith uses the phrase ‘invisible hand’ that has 
religious connotations, to imply something irreligious.  
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